

Message Text

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01
INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02
SS-15 USIA-06 SSM-03 NEAE-00 /072 W
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P R 011903Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3630
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USNATO
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 19972

USEEC

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (DAYAN), GW, IS
SUBJECT: DAYAN VISIT TO FRG

REFS: (A) BONN 19535; (B) BONN 19809

SUMMARY: DAYAN GAVE THE GERMANS THE STRONG IMPRESSION
THAT ISRAEL IS AIMING AT A SEPARATE, BILATERAL ARRANGE-
MENT WITH EGYPT. TO THE GERMANS' CHAGRIN, DAYAN
SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES PRESENTING
STANDARD ISRAELI POSITIONS THROUGHOUT HIS VISIT. THE
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER WAS CRITICAL OF THE ROLE
BEING PLAYED IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY THE EC IN GENERAL
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AND THE FRG IN PARTICULAR. DAYAN DID NOT GIVE THE
FRG DETAILS OF THE SADAT/BEGIN TALKS. THE ATMOSPHERE
OF THE VISIT WAS GOOD, ALTHOUGH DAYAN'S DINNER TOAST--
WHICH CONTAINED REFERENCES TO ALLEGED NEO-NAZISM IN
THE FRG AND "ABSURD" EUROPEAN POSITIONS IN THE UN--
WAS NOT WELL RECEIVED. THE FOREIGN OFFICE IS AT
BEST LUKEWARM TO THE FORTHCOMING CAIRO CONFERENCE.

END SUMMARY.

1. FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS WERE PLEASED WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN'S NOVEMBER 27-30 VISIT TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC. THEY BELIEVED THEIR DISCUSSIONS WITH DAYAN, WHICH INCLUDED A THREE-HOUR SESSION WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND A 10-MINUTE BEDSIDE COURTESY CALL ON AILING FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, WERE FRIENDLY AND WENT VERY WELL. THE TALKS FOCUSED EXCLUSIVELY ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. BILATERAL ECONOMIC TOPICS (REF A) WERE RESERVED FOR THE VISIT DECEMBER 5 OF FINANCE MINISTER EHRLICH. FOREIGN OFFICE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA (DR. JESSER) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN A BRIEFING GIVEN AN EMB OFF.

2. JESSER THOUGHT THE MAIN POINT OF THE VISIT WAS THE STRONG IMPRESSION GIVEN BY DAYAN, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, THAT ISRAEL WAS AIMING AT A SEPARATE, BILATERAL ARRANGEMENT WITH EGYPT. DAYAN EMPHASIZED THIS THEME OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI BILATERALISM IN ALL HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH GERMAN LEADERS. HE SEEMED PLEASED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS HAD EXCLUDED OTHER COUNTRIES FROM THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. TEL AVIV HAD FINALLY ACHIEVED ITS GOAL OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH CAIRO. JESSER
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STRESSED THAT WHILE BILATERALISM APPEARED TO BE THE ISRAELI POSITION, THE FRG HAD NO INDICATION OF EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON THIS SCORE.

3. DAYAN SHOWED NO FLEXIBILITY ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES DESPITE SADAT'S VISIT. HE REPEATEDLY CONFIRMED THE WELL-KNOWN ISRAELI STANCE I.E., NO PALESTINIAN STATE, NO RETURN TO THE JUNE 1967 BORDERS, AND NO PLO PARTICIPATION IN NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN ALSO SAID ISRAEL WOULD PURSUE ITS POLICY OF SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. HE JUSTIFIED THIS BY POINTING TO ISRAELI SECURITY NEEDS, HISTORICAL RIGHTS IN THE AREA, AND THE CONTENTION THAT THE SETTLEMENTS WERE NOT A BARRIER TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GERMANS, WHO HAD HOPED FOR SOME FLEXIBILITY IN LIGHT OF SADAT'S VISIT, WERE DISAPPOINTED WITH DAYAN'S RIGID STANCE.

4. DAYAN WAS VERY CRITICAL OF EC AND PARTICULARLY GERMAN POSITIONS ON THE MIDDLE EAST. HE STRESSED ISRAELI UNHAPPINESS WITH EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR A

"PALESTINIAN HOMELAND". HE WAS ALSO CRITICAL OF THE
US-SOVIET CALL FOR A RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE (REF B). DAYAN CALLED FOR AN ISRAELI
DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNITY BEFORE IT MADE FUTURE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 19972

PRONOUNCEMENTS ON MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. THE FRG DID NOT
RESPOND TO DAYAN'S REQUEST.

5. DAYAN TOLD THE GERMANS NOTHING ABOUT THE SADAT
VISIT THAT HAD NOT ALREADY APPEARED IN THE MEDIA.
JESSER MAINTAINED THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS NOT EVEN SURE
IF SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS HAD BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN
SADAT AND BEGIN. HE OFFERED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT
THE TWO LEADERS HAD NOT GOTTEN INTO SUBSTANTIVE
DETAILS DURING THEIR TEL AVIV MEETING. JESSER SAID
THE ISRAELIS HAD TOLD THE FRG EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV
THAT SADAT'S NEGOTIATORS WOULD MAKE SOME KIND OF

PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION AT THE CAIRO CONFERENCE.

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DAYAN TOLD THE GERMANS HE WAS "HAPPY WITH THE IDEA" OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, THOUGH HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WOULD MAKE SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS.

6. DAYAN ASKED THE GERMANS TO WORK FOR COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE; THE GERMANS DID NOT RESPOND. JESSER TOLD US PERSONALLY HE FORESAW POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE CAIRO MEETING. THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS CONVINCED THAT AN EFFECTIVE, LONG-TERM SOLUTION WAS NOT POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE INVOLVEMENT OF ALL PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ALONG WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL HE SPECIFICALLY NAMED SYRIA, JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, THE PALESTINIANS AND TO A LESSER EXTENT LEBANON. WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL CONCERNED, "SOLUTIONS WERE IMPOSSIBLE". CONTINUED BILATERALISM WOULD LEAD TO A SPLIT IN THE ARAB WORLD WHICH COULD PRODUCE NEW POLARIZATION AND FORCE THE "OUTS" TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE SOVIETS. THE FRG WAS VERY CAUTIOUS AND WHILE IT WOULD NOT PUBLICLY OPPOSE THE CAIRO MEETING, NEITHER WOULD IT WORK FOR EC ENDORSEMENT OF IT.

7. DAYAN BELIEVED SADAT'S VISIT TO ISRAEL WAS THE RESULT OF STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY. THE LATTER WERE SAID TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THEIR WEAKNESS AND HAVE RULED OUT THE MILITARY OPTION. THEY SAW A NEED FOR STABILITY IN THE AREA AND HAD PRESSED SADAT TO MOVE TOWARD PEACE. JESSER PERSONALLY HAD GREAT DOUBTS ABOUT THE ACCURACY OF DAYAN'S ANALYSIS.

8. THE GERMANS AND ISRAELIS ALSO DIFFERED IN THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE SAUDI ARABIAN ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. DAYAN BELIEVED EGYPT DID NOT NEED THE BACKING OF
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SAUDI ARABIA OR ANY OTHER ARAB COUNTRY AND THAT IT COULD MAKE PEACE ALONE, THOUGH THE REVERSE WAS NOT TRUE. HE ASSERTED THAT THE WEST EXAGGERATED JIDDA'S INFLUENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS. THE FRG ARGUED STRONGLY THAT SAUDI ECONOMIC POWER AND INFLUENCE COULD NOT BE OVERSTATED AND THAT A FINAL SOLUTION, AT A MINIMUM, REQUIRED SAUDI ACQUIESCENCE.

9. ALTHOUGH THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE GENERALLY QUITE GOOD, THE GERMANS WERE IRRITATED WITH DAYAN'S DINNER TOAST THE FIRST NIGHT OF HIS VISIT. HE HAD ADMONISHED THE FRG AND THE EUROPEANS IN GENERAL NOT TO BECOME MIRED IN A FOOLISH POLICY SIMPLY TO PRESERVE EUROPEAN UNITY. HE ALSO REFERRED TO "ABSURD POSITIONS" TAKEN BY THE EUROPEANS ON MIDDLE EASTERN ISSUES IN THE UN AND TO AN ALLEGED NEO-NAZI REVIVAL IN THE FRG. GERMAN OFFICIALS WERE IRRITATED WITH DAYAN'S REMARKS AND IN RESPONSE STRESSED THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE NINE IN A PEACEFUL MIDDLE EAST SOLUTION AND THEIR DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE TO EXPRESS THEIR VIEWS. JESSER FELT DAYAN HAD BEEN POORLY ADVISED IN MAKING SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS. (THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HAD DISTRIBUTED THE TEXT OF DAYAN'S REMARKS). DESPITE THIS INCIDENT, DAYAN HAD BEEN EXCEEDINGLY FRIENDLY IN HIS PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH GERMAN LEADERS AND THE CLIMATE OF THESE SESSIONS HAD BEEN GOOD.
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